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REEVALUATING AMATEURISM STANDARDS
IN MEN'S COLLEGE BASKETBALL
Marc Edelman*
This Note argues that courts should interpret NCAA conduct under the Principle
of Amateurism as a violation of§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and that courts
should order NCAA deregulation of student-athletes' indirect financial activities.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of NCAA regulation, specifically its Prin-
ciple of Amateurism. Part II discusses the current impact of antitrust laws on the
NCAA. Part III argues that the NCAA violates antitrust laws because the Princi-
ple of Amateurism's overall effect is anticompetitive. Part IV argues the NCAA
could institute an amateurism standard with a net pro-competitive effect by allow-
ing student-athletes to pursue business opportunities neutral to college budgets;
potential revenue sources would include: summer professional leagues, endorse-
ment contracts, and paid-promotional appearances.
Duke University decided during the 1994 college basketball sea-
son to sell sweatsuits bearing the name and likeness of its star
player, Grant Hill.' The Duke bookstore never asked Hill's permis-
sion to use his image and it never offered to share profits with
him.2 Instead, Hill was told that, just like any other student, he
could have a sweatsuit for $120. 3 Hill could get the money from his
parents, but not from his fans.4 He could earn money during the
summer, but not by accepting pay to play basketball, endorse
products, or promote events.5 He could continue generating reve-
nue for Duke University and the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA). However, Hill would lose his college basket-
ball eligibility forever if he generated revenue for himself because
that would violate the NCAA Principle of Amateurism.
The NCAA Principle of Amateurism is an agreement between
the 1271 member institutions of the NCAA that shapes the
* Associate Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 35. B.S., magna
cum taude, 1999, Economics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; MA(cand.) (sports
management), University of Michigan; J.D. (cand.) University of Michigan Law School. This
note is dedicated to my parents, Steven and Sandy Edelman, and to my brother David for
encouraging me to pursue my dreams. Special thanks to Rebecca Westphal and the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform editors for their assistance on this note.
1. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, PROB-
LEMS 735 (2d. Ed. 1998).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
6. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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relationship between NCAA member schools and their 361,175
student-athletes.7 The Principle of Amateurism forbids its members
from directly paying student-athletes and sanctions student-athletes
that receive monetary or in-kind compensation from outside
8
sources.
By placing labor-market restrictions on student-athletes, the
Principle of Amateurism reduces labor supply in four markets: col-
lege sports, summer minor league sports, product endorsements,
and event promotions.9 These inflated labor costs are likely passed
to consumers in the form of more expensive game tickets, products
and events. In addition, by not paying student-athletes, the Princi-
ple of Amateurism leads to windfall profits for college coaches and
administrators, who receive disproportionately high salaries and
additional endorsement/promotion opportunities.
College basketball players are especially hurt by the Principle
of Amateurism, as NCAA basketball yields the highest revenue-
per-player of any collegiate sport.1° Not only are college basketball
players at a financial disadvantage compared to their professional
counterparts, but the rules also disadvantage college basketball
7. See Composition of the NCAA (Mar. 1, 2002) available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/
membership/membershipsvcs/membership-breakdown.html (illustrating, in addition,
that the NCAA oversees 148,614 Division I athletes in 321 schools). See generally MatthewJ.
Mitten, Essay, ApplyingAntitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of "Big Time" College Athletics: The Need
to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the
21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2000) (explaining that although the NCAA
regulates various men's and women's sports across three divisions, the NCAA devotes signifi-
cant attention to Division I schools, which produce the highest revenue events and are most
likely to host future professional athletes).
8. Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College Athletes,
18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 313-17 (1998).
9. If the Principle of Amateurism did not exist, star student-athletes would likely earn
revenue in each of these three markets. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. Summer
sports leagues include: the United States Basketball League (USBL), which plays a late April-
through-June season and the Arena Football League (AFL), which plays a late April-
through-July season. These Leagues would be ideal opportunities for student-athletes, since
both compete on the minor-league level and have minimal overlap with the college, aca-
demic school year.
10. Presently, a tremendous percentage of intercollegiate revenue comes from men's
football and basketball. See generally Raymond Schneider, College Students' Perceptions on the
Payment of Intercollegiate Student-Athletes, 35 C. STUDENT J. 232 (2001). A disproportionate
percentage of college basketball revenue emerges from television coverage rights to the
NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament. In November 1999, the NCAA sold Tournament tele-
vision rights from 2002-13 to CBS for $6 billion ($550 million annually). Broadcast Rights to
Major Sports Properties, in SPORTS BusINESS JOURNAL: BY THE NUMBERS, THE AUTHORITATIVE
ANNUAL RESEARCH GUIDE AND FACT BOOK 58 (2002).
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players compared to both multi-sport athletes and the general
student body."
The public is similarly hurt by the Principle of Amateurism, be-
cause the practice leads to inefficient allocation of labor resources
as well as to a negative societal effect. By colluding to restrain the
financial opportunities of student-athletes, Amateurism influences
star college basketball players to leave school without graduating in
favor of professional leagues. 2 Many of these players are unpre-
pared to perform on the professional level, as indicated by many
young players' poor on-the-court performance and frequent legal
trouble off it.'3 This early exodus to the NBA on the part of high
school and college basketball players is to the public detriment be-
cause it leads to an inferior basketball product. Given these
anticompetitive effects on the various basketball markets, Amateur-
ism is the type of conduct antitrust law is intended to prevent. 4
11. Amateurism principles allow a partial exemption for multi-sport athletes, which
permits such athletes to declare themselves professionals in one sport while remaining ama-
teurs in the other, thereby permitting them to enjoy free market opportunities as they
pertain to their professional sport. Furthermore, amateurism principles do not extend to
other extracurricular activities. For example, actress Brooke Shields was allowed to partici-
pate in Princeton drama productions even though she received over $1 million from a
movie studio while she was in college. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COM-
MERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 17 (1999).
12. Disparate financial opportunities are increasing the burden of staying in school. In
1971, American Basketball Association superstar Spencer Haywood won an antitrust suit
against the NBA, striking down a four-year waiting period after high school before entering
the draft. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 E Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal.
1971). What became known as the "Haywood" ruling impacted few players in its early years,
as financial incentives to enter the NBA draft were significantly lower in the early 1970s than
they are today. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 390; Let the Madness Begin!: In the
Throes of March Madness, We All Must Wonder: What Are These Kids Really Worth!, Bus. WIRE,
Mar. 14, 2001 available at Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. Over the past thirty years, NBA
players' net worth has skyrocketed, not only from salaries, but also from endorsement deals
and public-appearance contracts. See Mark Asler, If the Shoe Fits: Commercial Relationships With
Would-Be NBA Stars Cultivated Early, WASH. POST.,July 25, 2001, at DOI. Many of today's play-
ers earn more money from endorsements than traditional salaries. Cf PHIL SCHAAF, SPORTS
MARKETING: IT'S NOT JUST A GAME ANYMORE 288 (1995) (discussing Shaquille O'Neal's
1993 estimated earnings). For example, in 1997-98, the league's highest-paid player, Mi-
chael Jordan, made $33 million in salary as compared to $45 million in endorsements. See
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 390.
13. See generally note 128, supra.
14. Antitrust law is centered on certain principles. Its primary principle is that society
is better off if markets behave competitively. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1 (3d. ed. 2000). Congress
was most concerned with monopoly and cartel conduct that restricts output, increases prices
to consumers, and results in monopoly profits. Id. at 5. High output, low prices, and accept-
able quality are popular goals. Monopoly profits are condemned for causing allocative
inefficiency or income redistribution from consumers to producers. Id. at 6. See generally
Mitten, supra note 7.
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This Note argues that courts should interpret NCAA conduct
under the Principle of Amateurism as a violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act' 5 and that courts should order NCAA de-
regulation of student-athletes' indirect financial activities.1 6 Part I
of this Note discusses the history of NCAA regulation, specifically
its Principle of Amateurism. Part II discusses the current impact of
antitrust laws on the NCAA. Part III argues that the NCAA violates
antitrust laws because the Principle of Amateurism's overall effect
is anticompetitive. Part IV argues the NCAA could institute an
amateurism standard with a net pro-competitive effect by allowing
student-athletes to pursue business opportunities neutral to college
budgets; potential revenue sources would include: summer profes-
sional leagues, endorsement contracts, and paid-promotional
appearances.
I. THE HISTORY OF NCAA REGULATION AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF AMATEURISM
The NCAA was initially formed as a quasi-governmental body,
responsible for preventing student-athletes from on-the-field inju-
ries. 17 Today's NCAA, however, is more like the headquarters of a
commercial cartel. Today's NCAA maximizes profits beyond a
competitive rate and maintains wealth in the hands of a select few
administrators, athletic directors, and coaches. 9 The NCAA
15. The Sherman Antitrust Act § 1 states: "Every contract, combination ... or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful Restraints,
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
16. One can categorize student-athletes' financial activities as either direct or indirect.
Direct financial activities, which are not advocated in this Note, include payment from col-
lege and booster accounts directly to student-athletes as compensation for competing in
college athletics. Indirect financial activities, which are advocated, include payments from
third parties to college athletes in exchange for performing a service, such as performing in
summer professional leagues, endorsing a product, or promoting an event.
17. See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Role
in RegulatingIntercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 9, 12 (2000) [hereinafter Smith,
Brief Histo-y].
18. SeeZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 98-101; seealsoNCAAv. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984) (holding that the NCAA's agreements with broadcasters
regarding the televising of college football games involved unreasonable restraints on trade
in violation of the Sherman Act).
19. See generally MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS
IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 229-30 (2000) [hereinafter SPERBER, BEER AND
CIRCUS]; MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT V. THE
[VOL. 35:4
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achieves such goals through its Principle of Amateurism, 2 an out-
dated vision of college athletics that prevents student-athletes from
profiting from their athletic abilities.2 '
Amateurism principles are specifically defined in Article 12 of
The NCAA Bylaws.22 The thrust of Article 12 is that NCAA basket-
ball players are not only forbidden from accepting college
basketball salaries, but these players are also prohibited from en-
joying the potentially profitable externalities of playing college
basketball. These include summer basketball employment, en-
dorsement contracts, and paid-promotional appearances.
Restraints of this nature are obviously atypical and indicate an un-
competitive market.
The Principle of Amateurism is an artifact from a different era,
when college athletics were truly amateur and regulatory action
UNIVERSITY 174-82 (1990) [hereinafter SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS]; ZIMBALIST, supra note
11, at 181-84.
20. The Principle of Amateurism states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate sport, and their participation
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social
benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avoca-
tion and student athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.
2001-02 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, CONSTITUTION § 2.9 available at http://Nww.ncaa.org/
library/membership/division_i_manual/2001-2002/A02.pdf.
21. See generally Mitten, supra note 7; Christopher W. Haden, Foul! The Exploitation of the
Student-Athlete: Student-Athletes Deserve Compensation for Their Play in the College Athletic Arena, 30
J.L. & EDUC. 673 (2001).
22. Section 12.1.1 of the NCAA Bylaws states:
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate com-
petition in a particular sport if the individual:
(a) Uses his or her athletic skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form
in that sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following
completion of intercollegiate athletics participation,
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athlet-
ics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received;
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses, or
any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organi-
zation based upon athletic skill or participation, except as permitted by
NCAA rules and regulations;
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team and knows (or has reason
to know) that the team is a professional athletics team (per Bylaw
12.02.3), even if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received; or
(f) Enters into a professional draft or an agreement with an agent.
2001-02 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, OPERATING BYL.Aws § 12.1.1 available at
http://wv.ncaa.org/library/membership/division-i-manual/2001-2002/Al2df [hereinaf-
ter NCAA OPERATING BYLAws § 12.1.1].
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served a more benign purpose. Chartered on March 31, 1906 as
the Intercollegiate Athletic Association and renamed the NCAA in
1910, the organization began as a group of sixty-two schools that
monitored college football rules. In 1905 alone, intercollegiate
football resulted in eighteen deaths and over 100 major injuries. 4
In late 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called for two White
House conferences to encourage reforming football rules to bene-
fit safety.25 The NCAA soon after was created to serve that
function.26
Despite Roosevelt's efforts, through the 1920s collegiate sports
regulation remained primarily a function of student-athletes and
faculty, with the NCAA playing a minor role in developing on-the-
field rules and organizing championship events.27 In the years
between World War I and World War II, commercialization began
to appear in collegiate sports, as football coaches such as Red
Grange began actively recruiting players.28
After World War II, with a dramatic increase in access to higher
education, largely through government support for returning mili-
tary personnel to attend college, public interest in collegiate sports
expanded dramatically.2) According to Rodney Smith, a law profes-
sor at University of Memphis and a former member of the NCAA
Infractions Appeals Committee:
Increased interest, not surprisingly, led to even greater
commercialization of intercollegiate athletics. With the advent
of television, the presence of radios in the vast majority of
homes in the United States, and the broadcasting of major
sporting events, these pressures further intensified.30
More colleges started athletic programs, while others expanded
existing programs, in an effort to respond to increasing interest in
intercollegiate athletics. An even greater increase in NCAA gov-
ernance and authority resulted when the NCAA promulgated
23. For background on this, see generally Kay Hawes, NCAA Century Series Part 1: 1900-
39 'Its Object Shall Be Regulation and Supervision,' THE NCAA NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, and also
Smith, Brief History, supra note 17, at 12.
24. Smith, Brief History, supra note 17, at 12.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 13.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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additional rules when faced with a series of gambling scandals and
recruiting excesses.3
In the 1950s, the NCAA significantly increased its scope as both
a regulatory body and as a commercial enterprise.' New NCAA
Executive Director Walter Byers established the NCAA Committee
on Infractions, which granted itself broad sanctioning authority.
3
Byers also signed the NCAA's first million-dollar television contract,
which signified a major shift in the NCAA's role, from a regulatory
body to a commercial entity.
34
Over the past two decades NCAA commercialization has grown
rampant, as the once safety-oriented body has emerged as the
headquarters of professional-like sports enterprise. Recent NCAA
commercialization is evident by the 2001-02 NCAA budget, which
anticipates $346 million revenue, of which $271 million comes
from television contracts, $37 million from championship events
and $27 million from licensing rights.3 A significant portion of
NCAA television revenue emerges from a $6 billion contract, which
allows CBS to televise the college basketball championship tour-
nament from 2003-13.3G
At the 94th Annual NCAA Convention, held from January 8-11,
2000 in San Diego, CA, the NCAA adopted two amendments to its
bylaws, further signifying its transition to commercialism. First, the
NCAA now allows athletic departments to license a university's
name and logos to commercial products without the explicit
approval of the university president. 37 By eliminating the need for
college presidents' approval in signing licensing agreements, this
amendment will enable NCAA licensing growth comparable to the
recent growth in NCAA broadcasting revenue. Second, NCAA
member schools may now accept monetary donations from
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Gary T Brown, NCAA Answers Call to Reform, 'The Sanity Code'Leads Asso-
ciation Down Path to Enforcement Program, THE NCAA NEWS, Nov. 22, 1999, at Al (explaining
the history lending to the establishment of the committee on infractions).
34. Smith, Brief History, supra note 17, at 15.
35. The NCAA 2001-02 Approved Budget, available at http://www.ncaa.org/financial/
2001-02_budget.pdf.
36. See Andy Gardiner, Small Arenas Lost in NCAA Site Shuffle, USA TODAY, April 3, 2001,
at 3C.
37. 2000 NCAA CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS amend. 59 at A-69. The proceedings state
that the intent of the amendment is: "[t]o eliminate the prohibition of athletics depart-
ment's staff members using the institution's name or logo in the endorsement of
commercial products or services for personal gain without prior approval by the institution's
chief executive officer."
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professional sports organizations, fortifying the NCAA role as a
minor league in which professional sports leagues maintain a
developmental stake. An alliance between professional sports
leagues and the NCAA would exasperate the existing labor market
problems by dissuading professional sports leagues from
developing minor league systems, which would otherwise compete
against the NCAA for young athletes' labor.
II. ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST LAW WITH RESPECT TO THE NCAA
In agreeing to abide by NCAA rules and regulations, the 1271
NCAA member institutions enter into a horizontal agreement,
which is an agreement among natural market competitors on the
way they will compete against one another. 9 Because the principle
thrust of the Sherman Act is to prohibit commercial monopolistic
conduct, courts have found that many NCAA rules are not re-
straints in trade, which the law seeks to protect.40 Such conclusions
are reached based on an inaccurate assumption that the NCAA is
not principally commercial in nature.4'
Thus, when NCAA rules are challenged as restraints in trade in
violation of the Sherman Act, courts look closely at the rule of rea-
son4 2 to determine whether the challenged rule promotes business
38. 2000 NCAA CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS amend. 61 at A-70. The proceedings state
that the intent of the amendment is to: "delete the list of conditions that preclude a mem-
ber institution from accepting funds from a professional sports organization."
39. Stephanie M. Greene, Regulating the NCAA: Making the Calls Under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act and Title IX, 52 ME. L. REV. 82, 83 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Courts review antitrust claims using two types of analysis, per se and rule of reason.
In Nat'l Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978), the U.S.
Supreme Court explained:
There are.., two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the first category
are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that
no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are "il-
legal per se" ... in the second category [Rule of Reason] are agreements whose
competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. In either event,
the purpose of the analysis is to form ajudgment about the competitive significance
of the restraint. ...
Unless cooperation, interdependence, or integration is needed to produce off-setting effi-
ciencies, direct agreements to fix price and restrict output are per se illegal. SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 14, at 140. Wage-fixing restraints are treated as price-fixing restraints
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objectives of the NCAA, which are illegal, or serves the primary ob-
jective of maintaining a competitive, amateur athletic league,
which are legal.43
Due to the misconception that amateurism principles have a
pro-competitive effect, many courts are too lenient when applying
rule of reason analysis against the NCAA.44 When student-athletes
file antitrust suits against the NCAA, courts consistently, and per-
haps unfairly, hold in favor of the NCAA.45 Banks and Smith are
representative of the case law, which show significant deference to
the alleged pro-competitive effects of amateurism.
In Banks, the plaintiff, a college football player for Notre Dame
who entered the NFL draft with one-year of eligibility remaining,
brought an antitrust suit against the NCAA. The plaintiff argued
that an agreement between NCAA member institutions that forbids
student-athletes from playing college football after entering the
NFL draft violates § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.46
The Banks court applied the rule of reason to hold that an
NCAA bylaw, which terminates college eligibility when a player ap-
plies to the NFL draft, does not have an anticompetitive effect
because the NCAA is not a "purchaser of labor.''47 The Banks court
argued that none of the eligibility rules restrain trade in the mar-
ket for college football players because the NCAA does not exist as
a training ground for future NFL players, but rather to provide an
opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing an
cognizable under the Sherman Act, because wage restraints reallocate labor resources to
other markets where employees are able to earn fair market value. See Mackey v. Nat'l Foot-
ball League, 543 E2d. 606, 616-17 (8th Cir 1976).
43. Greene, supra note 39, at 83; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984). The Court in Board of Regents held that it would be inappropriate to
apply the per se rule to the NCAA; instead, it decided to apply the Rule of Reason which
takes surrounding circumstances of the trade restraint into consideration.
44. Compare Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that college foot-
ball player failed to state a violation of the Sherman Act when based on the withdrawal of
NCAA eligibility when he choose to enter the NFL draft) and McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1998) (dismissing the plaintiff's antitrust complaint because the athletic eligi-
bility rules of the NCAA were reasonable and did not violate the Sherman Act prohibition
against unreasonable restraint of trade) with NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85 (1984) (asserting a violation of the Sherman Act when the NCAA member insti-
tutions created a horizontal restraint by placing a ceiling on the number of games a member
institution can televise).
45. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3rd Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 E2d 1081
(7th Cir. 1992).
46. Banks v. NCAA, 977 E2d at 1083.
47. Id. at 1091. The Majority disagreed with the Dissent, arguing that grant-in-aid
scholarships to college athletes are based on the school's tuition, not by the supply and de-
mand for players.
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education. 4s The court further stated that "[t]he NCAA Rules seek
to promote fair competition, encourage the educational pursuits of
student-athletes and prevent commercialism.""")
More recently in Smith, the Third Circuit upheld a district
court's dismissal of an antitrust claim filed by a postbaccalaureate
student who argued that the NCAA restrained trade by limiting her
collegiate eligibility to four seasons.)'O The plaintiff, a graduate stu-
dent-athlete, argued that the NCAA Postbaccalaureate Bylaw's
restraint is unreasonable.5' As in Banks, the Smith court held that
the eligibility restriction "primarily seek[s] to ensure fair competi-
tion in intercollegiate athletics" and does not promote business or
commercial interests of the NCAA.
Examining the Postbaccalaurate Bylaw under the rule of reason,
the Court of Appeals in Smith focused on whether the challenged
restraint enhances competition.3 The Smith court was persuaded
that by encouraging student-athletes to participate as undergradu-
ates and not preserving eligibility for graduate years, the bylaw
enhanced the competitive goals of intercollegiate athletics.
4
Such deference to the NCAA is not ubiquitous; courts are more
likely to hold the NCAA in violation of antitrust law when the
NCAA is challenged by a sub-group of colleges or coaches. In
NCAA v. Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
NCAA does not have a blanket exemption from antitrust laws, even
though it is a nonprofit entity with educational objectives, because
the "NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to
maximize revenues."' 6 Even though the NCAA was a nonprofit en-
tity, the Court held the NCAA was in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, because the member colleges agreed to a television
plan that "protects ticket sales by limiting output-just as any mo-
nopolist increases ticket sales by decreasing output.
,5 7
Consistent with the ruling in Board of Regents, the Tenth Circuit
recently held in Law v. NCAA that an NCAA-imposed cap of
48. Id. at 1089-90.
49. Id. at 1090.
50. 139 F3d 180, 186 (3rd Cir. 1998); see also Greene, supra note 39, at 84.
51. Smith, 139 F.3d. at 184.
52. Id. at 185.
53. Id. at 186.
54. Idat 187.
55. See NGAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (challenged
by the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia); Lawv NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010
(10th Cir. 1998) (challenged by basketball coaches and particular NCAA member institu-
tions).
56. 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984); see Mitten, supra note 7, at 3.
57. 468 U.S. at 116-17.
[VOL. 35:4
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$16,000 on Division I entry-level basketball coaches' salaries is an
unreasonable restraint of trade as a matter of law. Applying the
rule of reason, the court found this salary cap has the naked anti-
competitive effect of fixing one of the costs of producing Division I
basketball games without furthering product availability or com-
petitive balance among NCAA members in the least restrictive
manner. ' Again, the argument for an NCAA antitrust exemption
was refuted.
III. THE FALLACY OF AMATEURISM AS A PRO-COMPETITIVE
FORCE UNDER THE RULE OF REASON
Even though the perceived virtues of amateurism have led some
courts to apply the rule of reason in favor of the NCAA,60 today's
amateurism includes a significant commercial component, which
shifts the balance against the NCAA.6'
Some, such as Michael Acain, are clarifying that the amateurism
"model relies on an out-dated notion of amateurism inconsistent
with the present environment in college sports"6 2 and that the rules
limiting student-athlete wages operate as a restraint of trade on a
relevant commercial market.63 Evidence shows that the NCAA no
longer effectively encourages educational pursuits of student-S • 64
athletes nor prevents commercialism. Rather, the NCAA member
58. SeeLawv. NCAA, 134 E3d. 1010 (10thCir. 1995).
59. Id. at 1020; see Mitten, supra note 7, at 4-5.
60. Compare Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992) (arguing that the
court "should not permit the entry of professional athletes and their agents into NCAA
sports because the cold commercial nature of professional sports would ... destroy the ama-
teur status of athletics") with NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120
(1984) (holding that despite the need to preserve the tradition of amateurism, "rules that
restrict the output are hardly consistent with this role;" accordingly, the Court found
Sherman Act violations).
61. See generally Acain, supra note 8, at 310-13 (comparing the amateur/education
model with the commercial/education model).
62. Id. at 311.
63. Id. at 328; see also RichardJ. Hunter & Ann M. Mayo, Issues in Antitrust, the NCAA,
and Sports Management, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 69, 80-85 (1999).
64. See ALAN EDELSTEIN, EVERYBODY'S SITTING ON THE CURB: How AND WHY AMER-
[CA'S HEROES DISAPPEARED 72-73 (1996). Edelstein points out that commercial successes
are often of greater importance than are the scholastic abilities of the athletes. The sports
fan's desire to see winning teams creates "dubious ethics and financial excesses" in American
sports. See Dean A. Perdy et al., Are Athletes Also Students? The Educational Attainment of College
Athletes, 29 Soc. PROBLEMS 439, at 439 (1982) (arguing that the NCAA, the organization
responsible for policing university athletic programs, has mistakenly focused on violations of
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schools have become economic competitors that collectively pos-
sess monopsony power over the demand for college athletes and
65
monopoly power over the supply of college games.
Although the NCAA still claims to protect student-athletes from
exploitation,' it is more likely that today's NCAA serves to exploit
student-athletes through corporate athleticism, reaping significant
revenues from the players' work product.67 NCAA rules sometimes
show blatant disregard for student-athletes' scholastic pursuits. The
NCAA allows its member schools to conduct up to twenty hours of
formal practice per week. To remain competitive on the field, most
teams opt for the maximum number of practice hours. M In
addition, NCAA rules allow team captains to lead practice and
weight-lifting sessions, which extend beyond the formal twenty-
hour/week limit.0
Many recorded cases exist of college basketball coaches encour-
aging their players to take less rigorous courses in favor of athletics
and of college admissions officers admitting academically chal-
lenged athletes, but failing to provide them with adequate
academic services. 70 For example, former Drake University basket-
ball player Terrell Jackson filed (and lost) a suit against Drake
University after coach Tom Abatemarco allegedly encouraged him
to take easy classes and submit plagiarized work.7' Former Creigh-
ton University basketball player Kevin Ross filed a more successful
lawsuit against Creighton University for various tort and contrac-
tual damages after playing four years of college basketball for
Creighton despite an elementary-school level education and leav-
ing school unprepared for the workforce despite promises that he
would receive an education. 72 Among famous athletes, Dexter
Manley, a former NFL Defensive All-Pro who admitted that he had
amateurism, and has neglected to examine the education college athletes receive). See gener-
ally SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at 71-148.
65. Mitten, supra note 7, at 2-3; see, e.g. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 104-13 (1984); Hunter & Mayo, supra note 65, at 75-80.
66. See Acain, supra note 8, at 311-12; Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing
Models and Conflicting Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 278 (1994).
67. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 19 (pointing out that schools receive revenues
when star college athletes can generate more than $1 million dollars, but only receive com-
pensation for $10,000-$40,000).
68. See SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at 30-32.
69. See id.; 2001--02 NCAA DIVISIoN I MANUAL, OPERATING BYLAWS § 17.1.5.1.
70. Id. at 26-28; Purdy et. al., supra note 64, at 439-40.
71. Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 E Supp. 1490 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
72. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 E3d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
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entered Oklahoma State University in 1977 unable to read or write,
played there for four years, and left illiterate .
Furthermore, NCAA rules allow member schools to schedule
midweek road games despite the players' conflicting classroom
obligations.7 ' The NCAA Executive Committee exacerbates this
problem by scheduling NCAA Basketball Tournament games on
Thursdays and Fridays.7 Most disturbingly, the NCAA over the past
decade has shown increasing deference to a powerful core of non-
academic minded coaches, who advocate an elongated college
basketball season at the expense of student-athletes' academic
obligations. 76
Scholastic pursuits are sacrificed largely in favor of a member
school's commercial motives.7 The tremendous popularity of
men's college basketball creates a substantial revenue-generating
capacity and the prospect of increased visibility for universities.
Division I men's basketball revenues closely resemble professional
sports, as a significant percentage of the NCAA-budgeted $346 mil-
lion revenues and $336 million expenses involve college
basketball.79
According to National Sports Law Institute Director Matthew
Mitten, "[t]he significant economic rewards of winning have gen-
erated fierce off-field competition among universities for inputs
necessary to produce winning teams (e.g., coaches and players) as
well as efforts to fully exploit the economic value of their athletic
73. SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at 26.
74. See generally 2001-02 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, OPERATING BYLAWS § 17.5.5 (ex-
plaining that member institutions shall limit its regular season to twenty-eight games, but
does not limit the days or times of games). But see id. at § 17.1.5.1 (limiting the daily and
weekly hour limitations of four hours per day and twenty hours per week); see also SPERBER,
COLLEGE, INC., supra note 19, at 302-06.
75. For a listing of 2001-02 NCAA Tournament first round game scheduled on Thurs-
day and Friday, see NCAA Preview, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 2002, at E14; see also ZIMBALiST, supra
note 11, at 47 (explaining that in March 1996, CoachJohn Calipari brought his University of
Massachusetts Minutemen to New York for a Final Four Game on a Wednesday when the
first game was on Saturday).
76, ZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 47. In 1990, the NCAA caved to a powerful core of
coaches led by Bobby Knight and Rick Pitino and ruled against a proposal to shorten the
season for the sake of student-athletes' academic obligations. Id.
77. See SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at 28-30 (quoting Isaiah Thomas:
"'When you go to college, you're not a student athlete but an athlete-student. Your main
purpose is not to be an Einstein but a ballplayer, to generate some money, put people in the
stands.").
78. See Mitten, supra note 7, at 2.
79. The NCAA 2001-02 Approved Budget, supra note 35.
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products by maximizing fan and booster support, television reve-
nues and commercial sponsorships."'S
In college football, the net income for all football games in 1994
totaled $40.7 million, which was distributed among the participat-
ing universities."' For March Madness, the net income from the
1994 tournament produced $89 million, in addition to television
revenues. 2 CBS's exclusive agreement to air the NCAA College
Basketball tournament until 2002 is worth $1.7 billion dollars,
while CBS' new 11-year contract is worth $6 billion dollars.83
In addition to increasing sports revenues, fielding winning teams
has proven as an effective way for colleges to increase undergradu-
S14ate application rate. For example, at Georgetown, Patrick Ewing's
basketball performance during the 1982-83 NCAA season helped
generate a 47% increase in undergraduate applications and a forty-
point rise in freshman SAT scores."' The same effect is illustrated in
football, where Boston College's Doug Flutie helped raise applica-
tions 25% and increase accepted freshman SAT scores by 110
points in 1985-86, the year after Flutie won the Heisman Trophy as
the nation's outstanding college football player."
Since student-athletes are not allowed to profit from their skills,
men's college basketball revenues create a windfall of payments to
league administrators, directors, and coaches.8' For example,
NCAA Executive Director Cedric Dempsey, who will retire when his
contract expires at the end of 2002, currently earns $647,000 per
year plus non-monetary compensation, which includes a corporate
jet."" In addition, many men's basketball coaches earn more than
one million dollars in total compensation per year. s Furthermore,
it is becoming commonplace for universities to sign multi-million
dollar sponsorship agreements with shoe and apparel companies. 9°
80. See Mitten, supra note 7, at 2.
81. Acain, supra note 8, at 309.
82. Id.
83. Id.; See generally Gardiner, supra note 36.
84. See generally SPERBER, BEER AND CIRcus, supra note 19, at 60-68.
85. SeeWE]LER & ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 796.
86. See SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at 60-62.
87. See ZIMBaLIST, supra note 11, at 52; see, e.g. SPERBER, COLLEGE, INC., supra note 19,
at 148-202.
88. Id.
89. See Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressley III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal and
Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. FORUM 55, 56 (2000). Total compensation often
includes money from endorsement contracts. For example, Duke coach Mike Kryzyzewski
enjoys a $6.6 million sneaker endorsement contract, which pays him $375,000 annual salary
with a $1 Million signing bonus for requiring Duke basketball players to wear Nike shoes. Id.
90. See generally Schneider, supra note 10.
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Florida State University, Pennsylvania State University and the
University of Michigan are just three of the many schools that have
signed multi-million dollar sponsorship agreements with Nike."'
The existence of high-profile college basketball allows schools to
increase profitability, either by raising tuition prices, or by keeping
the tuition rate stagnant and reducing academic-related spending
on the overall student body. 9 A recent study noted that while an
average of 3% tuition dollars were allocated as NCAA revenue in
1989, by 1992 the figure increased to 6%.
Nevertheless, college basketball players lack monetary incentives
to remain student-athletes. College basketball players, not sharing
in the revenue generated by their talents, are increasingly forgoing
college in favor of the NBA. Over the past 20 years, NBA teams
have shown a growing propensity to draft players without college
degrees.' The number of players selected in the first two rounds of
the annual NBA Draft without a four-year college education has
increased from three players (6.5 percent of the overall drafted
pool) in 1980 to 25 players (43 percent of the overall drafted pool)
in 2001.'
Pressure to enter the draft early is strongest among players from
low-income families, of whom a disproportionate percent are Afri-
can-American. 96 Low-income basketball players often rush to the
NBA because of financial hardship, even when college would prove
to be more beneficial in the long run.9' Many players who left
school early would have completed their college degrees if NCAA
rules did not restrict financial freedom. For example, current
91. Id.
92. See generally SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at 69-148.
93. See generally Schneider, supra note 10.
94. See Michael Marot, Early Departures are Changing the Face of Recruiting, DETROIT
NEWS, July 14, 2001 available at http://detnews.com/2001/college/O107/14/college-
247471.htn.
95. See THE OFFICIAL NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA 333-34 (3d ed., 2001); 2001 NBA Draft Selec-
tions, ASSOCIATED PRESS & LOCAL WIRE, May 28, 1999.
96. See Kenneth Shropshire, Compensation and the African American Student-Athlete, in
RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 272-73 (Dana Brooks & Ronald Althouse eds., 2000) [here-
inafter Shropshire, Compensation]. For a more detailed account of the comparison of Black
versus White graduation rates in college athletics, see also Kenneth Shropshire, IN BLACK
AND WHITE: RACE IN SPORTS AND AMERICA 126 (1996) (demonstrating the four-year average
graduation rates of black versus white student-athletes at top-25 football programs).
97. One disturbing example of a player that was rushed into the NBA is Leon Smith, a
former ward of the State of Illinois, who in 1999 was selected directly from high school and
traded to the Dallas Mavericks. Smith lasted just one Mavericks practice before his immatur-
ity led to a confrontation with the coach. On November 15, 1999, Smith was taken to a
Dallas psychiatric ward after professional pressures led him to overdose on aspirin. See
Roscoe Nance, Troubled Smith Rebounds in the CBA, USA TODAYJan. 4, 2002, at 6C.
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Sacramento Kings forward Chris Webber left the University of
Michigan as a sophomore in part because he "could not afford to
buy fast-food dinner."98
According to Memphis Grizzlies player Shane Battier, a 2001
Duke University graduate and former Student Basketball Council
President,9 many of his teammates are unable to afford "movies
and a coke" because the NCAA placed such tight restrictions on
student-athletes' earning capacity.00 The NCAA-regulated financial
aid packages provide just enough compensation to cover tuition,
books, and the most basic needs.
Other players have decided to forgo college in favor of the NBA,
because the NCAA prevents student-athletes from seeking immedi-
ate and long-term financial stability. °1 For example, Orlando Magic
forward Tracy McGrady wanted to attend college; however, he
turned professional because amateurism rules prevented him from
signing an endorsement contract.' °2 Instead, McGrady signed a
three-year, $4.68 million contract with the Toronto Raptors directly
out of high school, and he supplemented his earnings with a six-
year, $12 million Adidas endorsement.1
3
Nevertheless, some commentators advocate maintaining ama-
teurism principles and continuing the partial NCAA exemption
from antitrust law. They point out that the average Division-I ath-
letic department reports operating losses and that the average
student with a college degree earns substantially more per year
than a student without a degree.10 4 These arguments, however, are
not entirely accurate when one considers all the relevant facts.
Although the average NCAA Division I program reported a
$823,000 loss in 1996-97,15 many of these figures are calculated
98. Brad Young, Questions Continue Over Paying College Athletes, THE DIGITAL COLLE-
GIAN, Apr. 12, 1995, available at http://www.collegian/psu.edu/archive/1995/04/04-12-
95tdc/04-12-95dsports-4asp.
99. The Student Basketball Council is a group of about fifty men's players. The Na-
tional Association of Basketball Coaches formed the group to pass recommendations from
players' points-of-view on to the NCAA. See Cason Bufe, College Players Seek Greater Say
with NCAA, THE DAILY NORTHWESTERN, Apr. 7, 2000 available at http://
wAww.dailynorthwestern.com/daily/issues/2000/04/07/sports/basketballcouncii.shtml (last
visitedJuly 5, 2002).
100. George Bullard, Let's Get Real and Pay College Ball Players a Decent Wage, DETROIT
NEWS, Mar. 25, 2000 at 3C.
101. SeeZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 140-141.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 10.
105. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 150; SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at
216-29 (explaining that although the revenues from Division I college athletics and their
commercial endorsements are high, most college sports programs lose money).
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after windfall payments are made to coaching staffs, administrators
and the NCAA. In addition, many of these figures are significantly
questioned based on accounting procedures, which designate
some athletics revenues and expenses to other college depart-
ments. 10 6 These figures also do not account for the possibility that
profit-generating sports such as mens' basketball subsidize the costs
of other Division-I sports, which lose significant amounts of
107
money.
Second, even if the average student-athlete increases earning
potential by completing college, a prospective professional basket-
ball player is not going to enjoy the same future monetary benefit,
as there is no evidence linking professional basketball salaries to
level of education. Third, neither corporate profit levels nor future
earning potentials of workers are affirmative defenses generally
considered in antitrust analysis.'08 Finally, there are compelling so-
cietal reasons for enforcing antitrust law against the NCAA beyond
economic efficiency as the next section demonstrates.
A. Amateurism's Negative Societal Impact
The college basketball industry is not necessarily the only indus-
try that avoids full antitrust scrutiny.' 9 However, review of the
NCAA Principle of Amateurism is imperative, even as compared to
the review of other industries' practices, because the Principle of
Amateurism has an ancillary negative effect on the development of
children's role models. " °
106. See id. at 152-65.
107. Id. The University of Michigan is a prototypical example of a school where one
sport subsidizes the remaining sports' athletic budgets. In 1994-95, Michigan reported just
$2.7 million in net income with its football team subsidizing money-losing sports. Michigan's
positive net income that year resulted from a surplus generated by its football team of $10
million. Id. at 159.
108. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 14, at 63-72 (explaining the defenses to an-
titrust suits that include first amendment defenses and common law defenses).
109. See id. at 75-77. Specific industries that are directly regulated by government, such
as insurance, railroads, agriculture, and fisheries, enjoy statutory exemption from antitrust
law. In addition, Major League Baseball benefits from the only non-statutory industry ex-
emption from antitrust law as a result of justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' ruling in Fed.
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat YLeague, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In that landmark opinion,
the Court held that baseball was not interstate commerce and exempted baseball from anti-
trust statutes. See generally JEROLD J. DUQUETTE, REGULATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME:
BASEBALL AND ANTITRUST, 31-32 (1999).
110. See, e.g., EDELSTEIN, supra note 64, at 65.
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American children idolize professional athletes, including NBA
players. "' However, the NBA's young players are disproportionately
cited for violence, drug use, and drunk driving, when compared to
NBA players overall and personal troubles are highest among NBA
players without college degrees. 12
The college experience promotes maturity, independence, and
work ethic."" However, NCAA rules financially influence basketball
players into forgoing their college education." 4 In addition to in-
hibiting student-athletes' academic and financial pursuits, NCAA
amateurism also reduces the supply of NBA role models."1
The entertainment industry in its various forms serves as an
American connection to heroes." 6 Sports figures first emerged as
role models in the United States during the 1920s." 7 With the ad-
vent of television in the 1950s and the Internet in the 1990s,
athletes today have an even greater presence in American homes.""
Sports figures play an especially significant role within low-income
and African-American communities.""' A recent study of African-
American children found that 85% of 10-year olds and 98% of
18-year olds considered a sports figure as their primary role
model.'2 0 Basketball players were the dominant role-model choice
within that group, named by 63% of ten-year olds and 98% of
18-year olds.' 2' George Assibey-Mensah, an African-American
sociologist, demonstrated that urban African-American children
believe the American dream consists of high-salary jobs, like those
held by professional athletes.
22
111. See id. at 71-75.
112. See generally note 128, supra.
113. See BURTON R. CLARK ET AL., STUDENTS AND COLLEGES: INTERACTION AND CHANGE
301-07 (1972); Chris Brown & Duane L. Hartley, Athletic Identity and Career Maturity of Male
College Student Athletes, 29 INT'LJ. OF SPORT PSYCHOL. 17, 22 (1998).
114. See SHROPSHIRE, COMPENSATION, supra note 96, at 272-73; cf NCAA OPERATING
BYLAWS § 12.1.1, supra note 22.
115. See EDELSTEIN, supra note 64, at 65-66 (arguing that with increased celebrity, pub-
licity. mostly negative, helps increase notoriety and commercial appeal).
116. Id. at 65 (explaining that the publicity surrounding a star athlete feeds on his ce-
lebrity status).
117. Id. at 67. The 1920s, marked by the arrival of Babe Ruth in Major League Baseball,
is often referred to as "The Golden Age of Sports." Id.
118. See id. at 67-68.
119. See George 0. Assibey-Mensah, Role Models and Youth Development: Evidence and Les-
sons from the Perception of African-American Youth, 21 WJ. OF BLACK STUD. 242, 244 (1997).
120. Id. Assibey-Mensah's study included 4500 African-American youths currently in
school, ranging from ages 10 to 18, and living in towns and cities in 22 states and the District
of Columbia that had a population of at least 50,000 and where African-Americans consti-
tuted at least one-third of the population. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 245.
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Society's adulation of athletes is unlikely to cease and it is there-
fore important for American athletes to portray the qualities that
we perceive as admirable in role models. A full college education is
important for aihletes, who, as potential role models, tend to
expand their identity, exploring aspects of self, which extend be-
yond the athlete role.'2 3 Independence, academics, exposure to
colleagues, and community service all help athletes to develop
these other aspects of self.
24
According to a psychological study, relationships in a college
environment have several positive effects.'2 5 First, the student envi-
ronment leads to growth in academic ability, autonomy and
independence. 26 In addition, this environment helps students to
develop a value system.
27
A consequence of positive college experience is that players with
college educations are more likely to engage in valuable
community service. This is evidenced by comparing the collection
of players in contention for the NBA Citizenship Award, of which a
majority have college degrees, with the list of players cited for
violence, drugs, and drunk driving, who are primarily
undereducated. 12 It follows that many NBA players scrutinized for
123. See Brown & Hartley, supra note 113, at 118; see, e.g., CLARK Er AL., supra note 113,
at 301-07.
124. See Brown & Hartley, supra note 113, at 118.
125. CLARK ET. AL, supra note 113, at 302.
126. Id. at 305. This effect is known as "accentuation."
127. Id. at 306. Clark refers to this effect as "conversion."
128. During the 2000-01 NBA season, many of the NBA's young superstars whom had
entered the NBA draft without college degrees were either arrested or found in violation of
the NBA code of conduct. Jason Kidd (domestic violence), Marcus Camby (on-the-court
violence), Lamar Odom (violation of NBA drug policy), Jason Williams (violation of NBA
drug policy), J.R. Rider (violation of NBA drug policy), and Rod Stickland (third DWI con-
viction) all showed the immaturity common to players without college degrees. See Bob
Baum, Kidd Admits Striking His Wife, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 20, 2001, at 7C; Camby Sus-
pended Five Games, Fined, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 18, 2001, at 6E; Martin McNeal, Williams
Smacked with Suspension: Kings Star Violated NBA Drug Program, SACRAMENTO BEE,
July 21, 2000, available at http://classic.sacbee.com/sports/kings/articles/2000/jul/
20000721kings lhtml (last visited July 5, 2002); Roundup-Briefly, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 8,
2001, at 5E; Tim Brown, Portland has Technical Difficulties; Pro basketball: Rasheed Wallace, a
Mountain of Talent, is a Volcano of Emotion with 41 Technical Fouls, Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 20,
2001, at D1.
Conversely, the three finalists for the NBA's 1998-99 Citizenship Award (Brian Grant
(homeless meals project),Jerome Williams (unprivileged children's charities), and Dikembe
Mutumbo (assorted African charities)) are NBA players with college degrees. See Blazers'
Grant wins NBAs Community Service Award, ASSOCIATED PRESS & LOCAL WIRE, May 28, 1999.
Furthermore, the winner of the NBA Citizenship Award has been a college graduate for
seven consecutive seasons, from 1992-93 through 1998-99-Terry Porte, Joe DUmars, Joe
O'Toole, Chris Dudley PJ Brown, Steve Smith, and Vlade Divac. See TImE OFFICIAL NBA
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disobeying society's mores would become better role models had
they grown academically and emotionally in college.
Given that children perceive even the misfit athletes as role mod-
els, 129 it is in society's best interest to persuade potential NBA players
to mature within the college environment. 130 NCAA amateurism,
which limits student-athletes' financial freedom, discourages
student-athletes from attending college, and consequently hinders
their maturation process.
B. Searching for an Alternative Solution
A positive externality of applying antitrust law to the NCAA is
that it promotes educating society's role models. Recognizing the
anticompetitive effect the NCAA has on the various markets and its
negative societal outcome, it is important to consider whether an
alternative, less-intrusive model for college basketball is feasible.
There are two often-suggested alternatives to amateurism: tradi-
tional revenue sharing3 and small "laundry money" stipends.3 2
Both alternatives would lead to sub-optimal outcomes. True reve-
nue- sharing exacerbates commercialization of college athletics
and inhibits compliance with Title IX of the Education Amend-
ment Act,133 while stipends are too limited in scope to effectively
reallocate player labor supply. 
1 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 95, at 344 (listing the winners of the NBA J. Walter Kennedy
Citizenship Award).
129. See PAUL WEILER, I.EVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 89 (2000) (explaining that the very
reason athletes are paid so much for endorsements is because they are important role mod-
els for young fans and future consumers); EDELSTEIN, supra note 64, at 65-66.
130. Tom Weir, Too Young to Play? Analysis Find Players Who Join the NBA Reap Big Benefits,
USA TODAY, Jun. 30, 1999, at IC (noting that NBA Commissioner David Stern does not want
the NBA or its rookie pay scale to provide an incentive for college players to leave school
early).
131. See Acain, supra note 8, at 335-45.
132. See Haden, supra note 21, at 679-81.
133. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). Title IX of the Education Amendment Act states:
"No person ... shall on the basis on sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance."
134. See generally note 130, supra.
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C. The Problem with Traditional Revenue Sharing
Advocates of revenue sharing believe that college basketball play-
ers are employees and that antitrust law's primary objective should
be to protect players from cartel-like behavior. 35 Their solution is the
commercial/education model . The commercial/education model
holds that college sports are a commercial enterprise and therefore
should be subject to the same economic considerations as other
industries. 37 Proponents argue that "[b]y establishing the impor-
tance of commercialism and discarding the traditional ideals of
amateurism, this model is more sympathetic to the possibilities of
',38rewarding college athletes with monetary compensation." The
underlying argument is that the NCAA regulations unreasonably
restrain trade in violation to § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.19
Revenue sharing is a familiar principle to the sports world.
Major League Baseball, the National Football League, the National
Hockey League, and the National Basketball Association all share
licensing revenue between players and ownership. 40 Moreover,
many NCAA conferences already share revenue among their
member institutions.1
4
'
According to the traditional revenue-sharing approach, student-
athletes should be treated more like employees, coaches, and pro-
fessors, and they should receive similar legal protection of their
economic opportunity. 42 The advantage of this approach is that it
prevents windfall payments to coaches and administrators because
colleges would make tradeoffs between signing high-priced players
135. Acain, supa note 8, at 331.
136. Id. at 312; Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Re-
alities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 279-81 (1994).
137. Acain, supra note 8, at 331.
138. Acain, supra note 8, at 312. Michael Acain, an advocate of the traditional revenue-
sharing, proposes a plan with four components: (1) a seniority based pay system, (2) post-
season compensation, (3) prize money for athletic and academic All-Americans, and (4)
shared team and player endorsements. Id. at 336-43.
139. Id. at 323-35; Davis, supra note 136, at 306-11.
140. Acain, supra note 8, at 336; Julie A. Garcia, The Future of Sports Merchandising and Li-
censing, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 219, 226-30 (1995) (explaining the revenue
sharing approaches of the National Football League, the National Basketball Association,
the Major League Baseball, and the National Hockey League).
141. Acain, supra note 8, at 336; SPERBER, BEER AND CIRcus, supra note 19, at 219 (re-
porting that schools in the six major conferences - the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big Ten, Big
12, Pacific 10, and Southeastern-pulled in 94% of the total $144.6 million paid out by the
twenty-three college football bowls in the 1999 season).
142. See Haden, supra note 21, at 674-75; Hurst & Pressly, supra note 89, at 58-59.
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and paying coaches and administrators.143 In a free market, schools
would compete for college basketball player labor. Market forces
would determine each player's salary based on his services' impact
on marginal revenue via ticket and concession sales, joint-venture
opportunities, and television contracts.
The main problem with traditional revenue sharing is that it
would also exacerbate the de-emphasis of undergraduate
education in favor of athletics, which University of Indiana
Professor Murray Sperber refers to as "Beer and Circus."'4 There is
an expanding belief among large public universities that it is more
cost-effective to provide non-athlete undergraduates with a four-
year vacation, filled with high-caliber sports teams, than it is to
provide students with four years of competitive academics.145 Many
large universities consequently recruit their undergraduate class by
offering a superior college basketball team rather than a talented
teaching faculty.'4
As long as it remains marginally cheaper to recruit basketball
talent than to improve academics, schools will continue to shift
academic resources away from academics and to athletics, improv-
ing their bottom-line profits. 47 Revenue sharing between college
basketball players and the university will likely lead universities to
allocate more money to the athletic departments, offsetting pay-
ments to student-athletes and further reducing academic
expenditures. 148
This traditional revenue-sharing approach would likely result in
poorly educated college students so long as the "Beer and Circus"
provides a greater financial return than the academic education
model. 49 Tuition dollars shift from academic expenditure to the
athletic department based on its higher perceived internal rate of
return. Further, many athletic department expenses may become
reallocated to other University divisions, disguising athletic-
department losses.
143. See Acain, supra note 8, at 343-45.
144. SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at ix-xv (arguing that colleges and univer-
sity funnel vast resources into their graduate programs, while neglecting the undergraduate
program and creating a party scene surrounding college sports that Sperber calls "beer and
circus" to keep the students coming).
145. Id. at 112-14.
146. Id. at 75-80. Under this approach, faculty hiring focuses primarily on research,
and pay scales are aligned with research contribution rather than teaching performance.
147. Id. at 230-38.
148. Id. at 273-75.
149. Id.
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A second problem with revenue sharing is that any proposal
would need careful tailoring to comply with Title IX.'"O Title IX re-
quires not only equal opportunities for participation, but also
equal treatment. 5 ' Therefore, any university that provides revenue
to its male student-athletes must provide it to an equal proportion
of its female athletes. 152 Generally, Division I universities have sub-
stantially more male student-athletes, given the size of football
rosters.' 53 Furthermore, male student-athletes account for a signifi-
cant percentage of revenue-generation, as men's basketball and
football are the two NCAA sports with multi-million dollar televi-
sion contracts. '54 However, it is unlikely that Title IX would allow
schools to provide student-athletes in these sports with a revenue
share reflective of percent generated.
5
A third problem is that while revenue sharing would improve
student-athlete standard-of-living and graduation rates, it fails to
resolve the effects of amateurism's ancillary, anti-competitive re-
straints on the minor league sports, endorsement, and promotion
markets. Summer professional basketball leagues such as the
United States Basketball League (USBL) could maintain a direct
cause of action against NCAA basketball because the Principle of
Amateurism, even with revenue-sharing, fails to efficiently reallo-
cate summer basketball labor.
Similarly, all companies using sports endorsers and promoters
would have a substantive antitrust claim against the NCAA, arguing
that the NCAA Principle of Amateurism, as an agreement among
insiders to decrease the supply of college athlete endors-
ers/promoters to zero, increases the cost to hire members of the
inside group, including college coaches as endorsers and promot-
ers, by preventing student-athletes from serving as part of the
market's labor supply.
150. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(2000) (promoting gender equity in all programs
of an educational institution that receive any federal aid).
151. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 69-73.
152. Acain, supra note 8, at 347.
153. Id. at 349.
154. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 69-73.
155. Id. at 70 (explaining that the absolute growth in average operating expenditures per
school on men's sports in Division I between 1990-91 and 1995-96 was 63 percent greater
than the total amount of operating expenditures per school on women's sports in 1995-96).
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D. The Problem with Stipends
The discussed alternative to traditional revenue sharing is a sti-
pend, which would provide the student-athlete with a scholarship
plus a small amount of money for living expenses. Several stipend
proposals exist.
Some have suggested that a nominal amount ranging from $30
to $50 per month should be added to all student-athletes' scholar-
ship packages to provide student-athletes with enough disposable
income to address concerns of a typical college student, including
returning home for a family emergency.15 6 Others believe that $900
a year, or "laundry money," would more appropriately compensate
student-athletes. 57 The "laundry money" stipend provides student-
athletes with funds for dating, gas money, and emergencies, with-
out subjecting universities to challenge of their tax-exempt status.5
As a third alternative, Duke's Battier recommends that the NCAA
give student athletes a stipend of at least $2000 per semester.159
Under each stipend proposal, the sum of money provides
student-athletes with an improved standard-of-living without sub-
tracting enough to impact university academic budgets.
Furthermore, if the stipend is distributed in equal amounts to all
student-athletes, Title IX requirements are likely met,16° even
though a stipend allocation to even non revenue-generating sports
becomes expensive."" A stipend would also prove effective in pro-
viding the lowest-income student-athletes sufficient meal money to
participate in basic weekend activities, potentially persuading some
student-athletes on the poverty fringe to remain in school.
62
The economic effects, however, of stipends are small. Stipends
not only fail to adequately address antitrust issues in the minor
league sports, endorsement, and promotion markets, but also fail
to provide young basketball players enough money to keep them
from leaving the NCAA for the NBA.
63
156. Hurst & Pressly, supra note 89, at 78-82.
157. Haden, supra note 21, at 679-81.
158. Id. at 680-81.
159. Dance with the Blue Devils, MAXIM, Mar. 2001, at 78-81.
160. See Hurst & Pressly, supra note 89, at 72.
161. Id. at 72.
162. Id. at 79-80; C. Peter Goplerud III, Stipends For Collegiate Athletes: A Philosophical Spin
on A Controversial Proposa4 5 KAN.J. L. & PUB. POLY 125, 130 (1996).
163. See, e.g., Weir, supra note 130, at IC (citing the statistic that the number of early en-
tries to the NBA draft who did not attend college rose from 19 in 1995 to 42 in 1996, to the
high of 47 in 1997).
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Even Battier's $2,000 per semester stipend proposal, the most
generous among the three, is insignificant when compared to the
opportunities available to players that forgo college. Consider, for
example, NBA basketball player Tracy McGrady's three-year, $4.68
million contract and six-year $12 million endorsement deal. 64 Even
if stipends serve as adequate welfare payments, providing student-
athletes with a slightly improved standard of living, they would still
fail to induce student-athletes to remain in school.
IV. THE SOLUTION: NCAA DEREGULATION
OF INDIRECT FINANCIAL ENDEAVORS
An optimal solution to the conflict between antitrust law and
academic integrity is simply the NCAA deregulation of indirect
financial endeavors, which is a middle-ground solution between
traditional revenue sharing and stipends. Deregulation has several
benefits over the alternate models. First, deregulation allows
student-athletes to earn close to fair market value without
disturbing academic integrity. Second, deregulation facilitates the
alignment of student-athletes' pay with the fair market value of
their services, without violating Title IX. Third, deregulation
removes the ancillary anticompetitive restraints that the NCAA
currently imposes on minor league sports, endorsement, and
promotion markets. Fourth, deregulation leads to a positive
societal externality, as student-athletes are more likely to graduate
from college and emerge as positive role models.
In a third-party deregulation model, the NCAA Principle of
Amateurism is upheld to the extent that college basketball players
remain prohibited from receiving payment directly from colleges.
Deregulation meets public policy considerations regarding "Beer
and Circus" because college tuition dollars are not shifted to stu-
dent-athletes in the form of salaries, thereby preventing the drain
on academic resources. 165 Furthermore, under the deregulation
model, NCAA member schools would no longer collude to prevent
the off-the-court ventures of student-athletes, allowing them to
profit from their fame and talent. Deregulation would also bring
164. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 141. In 1997, eighteen year-old Tracy McGrady was
the sixth pick in the NBA draft pick.
165. See SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 19, at 274-75.
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student athletes in line with non-athletes whose off-the-court ven-
tures are unregulated.1
66
Under the deregulation model, star college basketball players
earn close to fair market value as student-athletes become "free
agents" with three highly profitable opportunities: (1) playing in
summer professional basketball leagues,167 (2) signing endorsement
contracts, and (3) engaging in paid-promotional appearances.
Therefore, NCAA deregulation enhances distributive justice within
college basketball, while better aligning student-athletes' financial
incentives with society's goal of promoting educated role models.
The NCAA ban on college basketball players' paid participation
in summer leagues under the Amateurism principle creates a dou-
ble standard, as college students uninvolved in athletic programs
are allowed to pursue extracurricular activities.' 8 The conventional
college experience allows students to work in their preferred field
during the summer. Many superstar college basketball players are
considering athletic careers. A summer experience in professional
basketball would provide an opportunity for these student-athletes
to assess a sports career while earning some money, much as other
students do.
Currently, it is difficult to predict the viability of summer profes-
sional leagues, because few such leagues exist as a result of
insufficient labor supply. NCAA reform may lead to market oppor-
tunities for student-athletes to compete in summer leagues, as an
increased labor supply would make upstart minor leagues logisti-
cally feasible. This is especially true given consumer interest in
NBA and NCAA men's basketball,1 69 and the sparse use of indoor
basketball/hockey arenas during summer months.
Superstar college basketball players would benefit significantly
from endorsement opportunities, as this would prove an effective
166. See supra text accompanying note 22; ZIMBALIST, supra note 11, at 17-19.
167. For background on the United States Basketball League, see generally United States
Basketball League Expands for 2002 Season, Bus. WiRE, Dec. 19, 2001; Michael Dobie, It's Al for
the Game; Not NBA, but Reese at Home in USBL, NEWSDAY, June 27, 2001, at A68. For back-
ground into the National Basketball Development League (NBDL), see generally National
Basketball Development League Announces Inaugural Roster of National and Regional Marketing
Partners and Licensees, Bus. WiRE, Nov. 15, 2001; Aaron Beard, NBDL Grooming Players On, Off
Court in First Year Venture, ASSOCIATED PRESS, STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Mar. 9, 2002; Randy
King, Living Large in the NBDL, Dazzle's Biggest Star Working Toward Return Tip to the NBA, THE
ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at C1 (all wire and news reports generally available at Lexis-
Nexis Academic Universe).
168. See ZIMBALIST, Supra note 11, at 17-19.
169. NCAA Division I basketball games drew 24 million people in 2001. See 2001
National College Basketball Attendance (NCAA Division I), available at http://www.ncaa.org/
stats/m-basketball/attendance/2001_basketball_attend.pdf (last visitedJune 18, 2002).
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way to provide NBA-comparable revenues to elite players. Star col-
lege players have similar name recognition as professional players
and are therefore almost as marketable. As mentioned above, sev-
eral premier packaged goods companies are already involved in
NCAA men's basketball, ° and others would benefit from linking
products or services to a student-athletes' name equity. NCAA play-
ers would compete for sponsorships against all other basketball
players. Although individual endorsement payments would decline
(perhaps except in the case of a super-premium superstar like
Michael Jordan) as the pool of basketball endorsees expands, it is
possible that a high school graduate would be able to attend col-
lege and still negotiate an endorsement deal in the range of
McGrady's six-year, $12 million contract.
Although paid promotional appearances yield significantly less
than endorsement contracts, they are still a valuable market oppor-
tunity for the next tier of college basketball players. Promotional
activities often include business events, charity dinners, store
grand-openings, and sports-related ventures. Like endorsement
deals, promotional appearances would become available to players
based on positive name recognition.
The indirect model to subsidize college basketball players would
prove highly effective at aligning the indirect revenue
opportunities of college basketball players with those of NBA
professionals. Indirectly subsidizing college basketball players
would not persuade all basketball players to stay in college. Some
student-athletes, for instance, simply do not enjoy college or lack
the requisite grades and test scores. Others desire higher-level
competition, or believe the NBA's lifestyle and money is superior.
However, reevaluating Amateurism would persuade some NBA
hopefuls to stay in school, especially for those who heavily weigh
financial factors in deciding to turn pro.
Deregulating student-athletes' market ventures would have a
small impact on the underlying structure of college basketball. To-
day's college basketball is already highly commercialized, and
schools' revenue streams still would not go to players. College su-
perstars would indeed have larger bank accounts, but this would be
based on money earned. Coaches might make less money because
they would compete with players for endorsement deals. Coaches,
however, would still command high salaries from their respective
schools. Moreover, coaches would have an easier time recruiting
170. Such corporations include American Express, General Motors, and Holiday Inn.
See Becky Yerak, March Madness Adds Slip, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 16,2001, at B1.
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professional prospects. Furthermore, the NCAA and its member
institutions might become more profitable, as men's college bas-
ketball's popularity would benefit from players staying in school for
four years.
Deregulation obtains these positive market effects while comply-
ing with Title IX. Unlike the revenue sharing and stipend
alternatives, deregulation does not involve any payment from edu-
cational institutions to student-athletes, and therefore is free from
the regulation's scope. 17' Deregulation is not a circumvention of
equal rights law, but rather a proper understanding of its spirit.
Deregulation will not only provide opportunity for star men's col-
lege basketball players to earn money, but it will also pave the way
for women's minor league sports, and endorsements, and promo-
tion opportunities involving female student-athletes.
Deregulation also achieves these results while asserting effi-
ciency in the minor league, endorsement, and promotion markets.
Unlike the revenue sharing and stipend proposals, which amelio-
rate antitrust concerns only within the myopic scope of the college
labor-market, deregulation also removes the NCAA-imposed labor
restraints on these ancillary markets. The anticipated net results of
deregulation include the emergence of more minor league sports,
which will drive down ticket prices for each event, and an increased
labor market for endorsers and promoters. This larger labor pool
will reduce the overall cost of such services and pass on the savings
to the final customer in the form of cheaper products and events.
Finally, deregulation would help achieve the important societal
goal of promoting higher role-model graduation rates. Student-
athletes would have the opportunity to mature in a college
environment and would then enter the NBA prepared to serve as
role models. Most likely, violence, drug use, and drunk driving
among NBA players would decline, as incoming players' maturity
would more closely mirror that of today's players with college
degrees. As a result, American society would find true role models
in the athletes that our children idolize.
Admittedly, the problem with deregulating student-athletes'
third-party ventures is that deregulation fails to address the educa-
tional needs of student-athletes. Although deregulation does not
adequately address the special academic needs of some student-
athletes, it is still a welcome reform, as it will persuade some of the
top college basketball players to stay in school. Those student-
athletes who choose to stay in school are more likely predisposed
171. SeeAcain, supra note 8, at 347.
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toward academic achievement. Furthermore, additional income
will facilitate the hiring private tutors and the purchasing of study
aids for those students no predisposed to academics.
Lastly, deregulation skeptics should consider all the positive im-
pacts of such a simple, easily implemented solution. Deregulation
effectively resolves market efficiency not only in the student-athlete
labor market, but also in the minor league sports, endorsement,
and promotions markets. Deregulation achieves such results with-
out drastic departure from existing principles of education, college
athletics, market efficiency, and civil rights. Consequently, deregu-
lation solves many, albeit not all, problems caused by amateurism
with a single, non-revolutionary court mandate.
CONCLUSION
The changing economics of college athletics has played a
significant role in the emergence of the NCAA as a cartel, which
agrees to maintain wealth in the hands of a select few
administrators, athletic directors, and coaches. Such cartel activity
has led to inefficient allocation of basketball labor resources across
the college, professional and minor league basketball markets, as
well as the product endorsement and event promotion markets.
Because the virtues of amateurism, which once saved the NCAA
from Sherman Act Section 1 antitrust scrutiny, are no longer
relevant, antitrust law should correct market inefficiencies that it
has allowed to develop by refusing to sanction NCAA cartel-like
conduct. Beyond traditional market inefficiencies, the courts must
also consider ancillary societal effects caused by the NCAA,
including amateurism's impact on the development of sports role
models.
Although there are two often-discussed reform movements
to amateurism in college athletics-revenue sharing and
stipends-neither is of a wide enough scope to improve efficiency
across all relevant markets, maintain academic integrity, and com-
ply with Title IX.
A superior reform to both revenue sharing and stipends is the
deregulation of indirect financial endeavors by student-athletes.
Deregulation would provide student-athletes with the opportunity to
profit from summer professional sports leagues, endorsement
contracts, and paid-promotional performances. Likewise, deregula-
tion will achieve market efficiency across sports and endorsement/
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promotion markets, without shifting academic resources to athletic
departments or violating the spirit of Title IX.
Overall, deregulation is an easily implemented solution that of-
fers a wide range of efficiency and distribution advantages over
traditional amateurism. As college athletics enters its second cen-
tury, it is important for courts to interpret the NCAA Principle of
Amateurism as a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and to or-
der the NCAA to make the transition into an era of deregulation.
